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Abstract
According to a still-lingering scenario, it was not until late in the nineteenth century
that ‘private’ Europeancommercial (andplantation) enterprise gainedany real traction
in the Netherlands Indies. As a number of scholars have noted over the last few
decades, this needs to be heavily revised on several major counts. Nonetheless, the
implications of such revision for an understanding of European mercantile activity in
mid-nineteenth century Java have been slow to seep through. Building on the work of
other scholars and exploiting a variety of original sources, in a preliminary fashion this
paper sets out to repair this deficiency.
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The business historian Tony Webster has recently drawn our attention to ‘the
changingnature of […] [British andEuropean] business in theEast, and its rela-
tions with the colonial administration and indigenousmercantile elites’, which
began in respect to the uk in the ‘Twilight’ of the (British) East India Company
(eic). In 1813 the Company lost its centuries-old monopoly on trade with the
Indian subcontinent, and twenty years later, in 1833, its parallel monopoly on
tradebetween the subcontinent andChina. In effect, its commercial operations
were privatized. Finally, in the wake of the Great Indian Uprising of 1857–1858,
its operations were wound up in their entirety. This period of nearly half a cen-
tury, however, saw not only the slow demise of the eic but also a series of new
commercial initiatives by private mercantile groups that took place partly in
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opposition to, and partly in conjunction with, surviving eic interests. More-
over, ‘parallel to the emergence of new firms andnewpressure groups in Britain
and the East’, Webster argues, ‘was a revolution in the organisation of British
firms in Asia, and the nature of British economic relations with Asia’ (Webster
2009:10).
These developments, however, were not limited to the British sphere; they
also had important parallels in the extensive Dutch possessions in Asia dur-
ing the early decades of the nineteenth century. Most immediately, what took
place there was contingent on the collapse of the Vereenigde Oost-Indische
Compagnie (voc, United East-India Company)—the EIC’s Dutch equivalent—
at the end of the eighteenth century, and the incorporation of its Indone-
sian possessions into a new Netherlands Indies state. It was there, primarily
in Java, far more densely populated and much richer agriculturally than the
larger islands of the archipelago, that firms grew up in the wake of the demise
of the VOC. They merit the same sort of discussion that Webster and others
have brought to the study of their counterparts in the Indian subcontinent. Of
course, therewere differences. Not least, the vocwas removed from the scene a
full half century before the British Company’s mid-nineteenth-century Götter-
dämmerung. Even so, there were clearly similarities. Mid-nineteenth-century
Java, like British India, was characterized by the existence of a cosmopolitan
mercantile community—acommunity comprised of firms located along global
commodity chains, the principal of which, in this case, related to cotton goods,
coffee, and sugar. A further, and fundamental, similarity was that the firms in
Java also existed ‘under the shadow’ of a quasi-monopolistic trading corpora-
tion, the nhm or Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (Netherlands Trading
Association), founded in Holland under royal patronage in 1824 and, in some
limited respects at least, the ‘successor’ of the voc (Mansvelt [1924, 1926]; De
Graaf 2012).
Partly because of this, until recently the historical significance of Java’s mid-
nineteenth-century mercantile houses has been underplayed in the relevant
literature.1 An older historiography was centred on the idea that the (Euro-
pean) commercial firms of mid-nineteenth-century Java operated in a political
environment that constrained, limited, and was indeed profoundly hostile to,
their growth. On this reckoning, it was all these things because of the purported
domination of the colonial sector of Java’s economy by a state-run system of
1 The prime account to date of the business world in the Indies from the 1840s through to the
1870s is Claver 2006:49–81. See also [Mansvelt] 1938; Van Horn 1997; Bosma 2005.
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commodity production (the Cultuurstelsel, or System of [State] Cultivations)
functioning in tandem with the nhm as the state’s mercantile arm.2 This way
of looking at things at least had the merit of highlighting the importance of
political context. This is nowhere more so, perhaps, than in colonial settings
where synergies between state and capital were often vital to the fortunes of
mercantile concerns. It is precisely in this respect, however, that a rather tat-
tered earlier account of the Cultuurstelsel and the nhm is seriously mislead-
ing.3 Far from serving as a constraint on mercantile enterprise, the two acted
together as an incubator for ‘private’ capital in this as in other sectors of the
colonial economy. Indeed, the circumstances of bourgeois capital growth in
mid-nineteenth-century Java are such as to render problematic the supposed
divide between ‘private’ and ‘state’ enterprise.
This article sets out to perform two interlinked tasks closely related to this
argument about the need for reappraisal. The first is to identify a number
of major general characteristics of Java’s colonial mercantile houses in the
middle decades of the nineteenth century, roughly in the period 1850–1870.
The second is to use brief case studies of four particular firms to explore
these characteristics in greater depth and over time. Accordingly, the first
half of the article deals with topics including the broader Asian context in
which European mercantile houses operated in mid-nineteenth-century Java;
general issues of mercantile finance; the location of mercantile houses along
the commodity chains in which they were enmeshed; and, closely linked with
this, the relations betweenEuropeanmercantile houses and theDutch colonial
state in the Indies. The second half of the article then sets out to add flesh to
the bones by taking as examples the mid-century history of four Indies firms:
Paine Stricker, Schimmelpennick, Kopersmit, andMaclaineWatson. As will be
explained, the choice is—of necessity—a somewhat arbitrary one, but serves
nonetheless to illuminatemercantile operations in the colony to a significantly
greater extent than has been feasible hitherto.
2 For an extreme statement of this position (‘the Culture System grew until it overshadowed
and blighted the whole economic organisation of the country, and nothing remained but the
Government as aplanter on a superhuman scale,with thenhmas its sole agent’), see Furnivall
1939:121.
3 Themisleading character of this older literaturewas remarked uponmore than half a century
ago by Coolhaas (1964) and—muchmore recently, and in substantiating detail—by Houben
(1993b). Further significant recent literature is reviewed in the text below. i
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A CosmopolitanMercantile Community
The context in which these several developments took place was one of mer-
cantile networks that were cosmopolitan rather than exclusively ‘European’.
Local and regional Chinese and Arabmercantile networks played a critical role
in articulating the key commodity chains in which Java’s mercantile houses
were enmeshed, both in Java itself and in the adjacent archipelagoes. As was
the case in other major Asian centres of Europeanmercantile enterprise in the
middle decades of the nineteenth century, a key facet of the ongoing business
of Java’s mid-century European mercantile houses was the so-called ‘Country
[that is, intra-Asian] Trade’. This trade inevitably involved collaboration with
Asian traders and shippers. One potentially productive way of conceptualizing
the relationship is to adopt Michael B. Miller’s recent formulation of ‘the over-
lay of one network over another’ and of the ‘loop[ing] through’ of European
shipping andbusiness networks by theirAsian counterparts (Miller 2012:2, 109).
However formulated, any notion that the colony’s Europeanmercantile houses
operated in ahermetically sealedworld iswellwideof themark. In the 1820s, for
example, it was reported that Eliza Thornton, the woman who ran the epony-
mous family firm inBatavia,was on such good termswith the town’s Indies Chi-
nese merchants, and had such a good understanding of them, that ‘she might
herself even be thought of as Chinese’.4 Armenians also featured throughout
the nineteenth century as a substantial presence among Java’smerchants,5 and
someyears ago, in apioneering article, FrankBroezedrewwelcomeattention to
the extent to which Java’s mid-century merchant fleet was in the hands of Chi-
nese and, above all, Arab entrepreneurs (Broeze 1979; Clarence-Smith 2002).
Throughout maritime Southeast Asia, an extensive intra-regional (as well as
intra-Asian) trade was carried on there by Asian rather than European mer-
cantile networks (Kobayashi 2012). Java’s European merchants were, of course,
well aware of this. One of them, Gillian Maclaine, appearing before a British
parliamentary committee in 1831, extrapolated at some length on the fact that
not only was ‘the commerce of the country’ carried on ‘chiefly by the Chinese’,
but also that ‘they trade[d] largely with the eastern islands and with the Malay
peninsula, and also with Europe’.6
4 From a letter written c. 1823 by Candidus ten Brink, partner in the firm of Ten Brink & Reynst,
quoted in Molsbergen 1936:5–8.
5 For the tip of this particular iceberg, see for example De Bree 1928, i:121, 213, and Claver 2012.
6 ‘Select Committee of the House of Commons on China and the affairs of the East India
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TheMoney Trail: Finance for the Mid-nineteenth-century
Mercantile Enterprise
Webster has observed of early-nineteenth-century Calcutta that ‘Indian mer-
chants were not only a vital source of capital, they also understood the inter-
nal systems of trade and finance which existed in the Subcontinent’ (Webster,
2007:78–84). By way of contrast, Europeanmerchants in Java operated there in
the absence of a discernable Javanese capitalist or merchant class. As we have
just seen, however, they did operate alongside, and in inevitable collaboration
with, a substantial community of Chinese Indonesian andArabmerchants and
capitalists. Like their Indian counterparts in Calcutta (for example), they were
well versed in the operation of Java’s ‘internal systems of trade and finance’. For
much of the nineteenth century, for example, the leading Chinese mercantile
families in these communities were the exclusive farmers of the Indies govern-
ment’s opium monopoly, which, inter alia, gave them unrivalled access to the
island’s interior as both traders and moneylenders.7 As capitalists, moreover,
they certainly entered into dealings with a number of European business peo-
ple and entrepreneurs in mid-nineteenth-century Java. The big Surabaya mer-
chant and ‘entrepreneur’ (one Governor General referred to him more frankly
as ‘a scoundrel’) J.E. Banck, for example, could hardly have made his way in
the world to the extent that he did—he retired to Holland in the 1840s as a
very rich man—without the backing of leading Chinese Indonesian capital-
ists active in East Java.8 Likewise, in Semarang back in the 1820s, the Scottish
merchant John Deans’ convivial relations with that city’s Chinese mercantile
elite—‘I have dined with the [wealthy] Chinese merchants at as good a dinner
as I could have got anywhere in India’9—would certainly have extended well
beyond a shared taste in fine cuisine.
Matters may well have changed over time, however, and by the 1860s (in
so far as it is possible to be certain about these things) it does not look as
if there was much ‘Chinese’ money involved in the business dealings of the
Company, 1831–2’, Vol. vi, ‘Evidence Gillian Maclaine 1831’, p. 85, House of Commons Parlia-
mentary Papers. See also Blussé 2011; Tagliacozzo 2011; Chan Kok Bun 2000.
7 For an introduction to Java’s Indies Chinese business communities, see Rush 1990.
8 For Banck (b. Scheswig 1797 d. The Hague 1857) and his various business partners, both
‘European’ and Chinese Indonesian, see Bosma and Raben 2008:126–7; Baud 1983, ii:262, 304
and 1983, iii:155.
9 ‘Select Committee of the House of Lords on the East India Company 1830’, Vol. vi, ‘Evidence
of John Deans’ pp. 233–5, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers.
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European mercantile firms then operating in the colony. It is significant, for
example, that two substantial bankruptcies of European mercantile firms in
both Batavia and Surabaya in the 1860s (see below) revealed virtually no Chi-
nese names among the creditors. It was now the norm, so it appears, that
European (import) merchants were the creditors of Chinese traders, some-
thing that they had been since the 1820s or earlier, but which nowbecame their
predominant role (Claver 2012:113–21). There are indications that the upsurge
(see below) in the commodity trade conducted by the European mercantile
houses during the 1850s and 1860s meant that, particularly under state patron-
age, the European sector of Java’s cosmopolitan mercantile community was
gaining in traction in themid-century decades vis-à-vis its Chinese Indonesian,
Arab, and Armenian counterparts. To be sure, the question is a vexed one on
a number of counts. Not least, the available documentation tends to privilege
the European sector, and a note of caution is appropriate. It is noteworthy, for
instance, that in 1870s’ Batavia oneprominentEuropean firm, as it nowappears,
drew a great deal of its commercial strength from its close and enduring rela-
tions with the city’s ‘very wealthy’ Arab ‘Major’ (the Dutch appointed leader
of his community), Said Hoessin bin Mohamad bin Aboe Bakar Aydiet (Claver
2012:118).
The broad picture of how Java’s mid-century mercantile houses financed
their operations is hence a complex one. Few of the people who established
firms in the mid-century decades came to the colony replete with capital
(De Bree 1928, i:208). Some of their funds were raised in the Indies, not least
from individuals who left capital there when they themselves repatriated.
Commercial creditors in Europe were likewise deeply embroiled. Some of the
latter were ‘accidental’ or unwitting suppliers of capital, in so far as colo-
nial firms made (temporary) use of balances accumulated in the commod-
ity trade to finance their operations in Java. In some cases, however, prin-
cipals in Europe made direct investments. It appears, in particular, that the
Batavia-based firm of Reynst & Vinju’s considerable expansion in the mid-
1860s into the ‘plantation’ sector (in conjunction with their newly forged close
association with the Surabayan firm of Anemaet & Co), was partly financed
by a direct injection of capital from Rotterdam by Van Hoboken, the Dutch
firm with whom they had been closely associated since the 1820s (Molsber-
gen 1936:25–7). During the mid-century decades, however, direct metropoli-
tan investment of this kind was exceptional. However precariously, locally
accumulated capital and short-term commercial credits from business corre-
spondents in Europe (or North America) appear to have made up the bulk
of the funds available to the colony’s mid-century mercantile houses. As we
shall see, Europe-based institutional sources of finance began to appear in Java
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during the 1860s, but the amount of capital involved can at that time be safely
assumed to have been fairly modest.10
Commodity Chains and Commodity Production: The Cultuurstelsel
in Mid-nineteenth-century Java
Java’s mid-century mercantile houses were as tightly integrated as evolving
systems of communication would allow into commercial networks and com-
modity chains that were global in character. Inter alia, this was evidenced by
the regular ‘price courants’ supplied to interested parties overseas and by the
fact that the major firms were demonstrably in constant commercial inter-
course (usually in the form of fortnightly letters) with ‘correspondents’ in
Europe, North America, and other colonial settlements in Asia.11 As far as
the key European connections were concerned, matters were greatly facili-
tated from the late 1840s onward by the development of the so-called Over-
land Mail (which reduced the time it took to receive a letter from more than
three months to less than six weeks). The arrival of the telegraph some two
decades later meant that market reports could travel between Batavia and
western Europe in a matter of hours, and (potentially, at least) revolution-
ized risk-taking in often extremely volatile world markets. Indeed, so cru-
cial had telegraphic communication become that, even before the cable itself
reached Batavia in 1870, steamers were used to bring the vital telegrams from
the nearest telegraph station, initially at Pont de Galle in Sri Lanka and sub-
sequently at Singapore. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1871 served further
to speed up—though hardly revolutionize—a global system of communica-
tions that had already been radically transformed over the preceding three
decades.
10 At the end of 1865, for example, after two years of operations in the colony, the advances
made by the Nederlandsch-Indische Handelsbank (Netherlands Indies Trading Bank) to
sugar manufacturers and coffee and tobacco planters amounted to just over 1,000,000
guilders (Korthals Altes 2004: 58). This was scarcely more than the sum accumulated on
the debit side of the ledger of one single Batavia mercantile house (Schimmelpenninck &
Co, see below) at the time of its bankruptcy earlier in the same decade.
11 This emerges clearly, for example, from the newly available archives of the great Ams-
terdam commercial house of Van Eeghen, examples from which are quoted below. See
Stadsarchief Amsterdam [hereafter: saa], Archief Van Eeghen [hereafter: ve]. My thanks
to the Stadsarchief ’s indefatigable archivist, Bart Schuurman, for his invaluable and gen-
erous help.
320 knight
Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 170 (2014) 313–341
Articulated by this evolving framework of communications, the commerce
inwhich themid-centurymercantile houses engaged consistedprimarily in the
import of cotton goods (mostly from theNetherlands, c. 1840 onward) intended
for sale within Java and elsewhere in the archipelago. Exports were more var-
ied: coffee and sugar were the main ones, but tobacco, indigo, hides, and rice
also featured. Coffee had been exported in considerable quantities from Java to
western destinations since themiddle of the eighteenth century. The output of
Java’s long-established sugar industry, on the other hand, historically had gone
largely to markets elsewhere in Asia and the Middle East. During the middle
decades of the nineteenth century, however, under the impetus of new com-
mercial opportunities in Europe and North America, the bulk of Java’s rapidly
expanding production of the commodity reached customers ‘west of Suez’.
The greatest single impetus to this expansion of Java’s mid-nineteenth-
century export trade—in sugar and coffee in particular—came from the oper-
ation of the Cultuurstelsel, which from c. 1830 onward drove up the production
of both commodities to unprecedented heights. Initially, most of this increased
production came into the hands of the Indies government’s ‘commercial arm’,
the Batavia branch-office, or Factorij, of the nhm, which organized its ship-
ment for sale in Amsterdam. In regard to sugar in particular, a key role was
played here by nearly one hundred government sugar contractors located in
the lowlands of East and Central Java (all of them either Europeans or Chi-
nese Indonesians), who supplied the nhm with the bulk of their output as
part of contractual arrangements with a state that provided the manufactur-
ers with capital, raw material, and labour. From around 1850 onward, however,
the dynamics of this situation began to change in ways that greatly promoted
the growth of ‘private’ mercantile enterprise. Indeed, in modern parlance, the
Cultuurstelsel began to be ‘privatized.’
In consequence, increasing quantities of the commodities produced under
the aegis of the Cultuurstelsel came into the hands of Java’s mercantile houses,
particularly those in the European sector. They did so as a result of several par-
allel developments, including the increased amount of so-called ‘free disposal’
sugar coming onto the market in Java from factories operating on contract to
the Indies government,12 and because of the sale by auction in Batavia (c. 1860
onward) of quantities of ‘government’ sugar and other commodities. Also of
considerable significance, however, was the expansion of production in the
12 ‘Free disposal’ sugarwas the part of the factory’s output that the contractingmanufacturer
was not obliged to deliver to the Indies government’s (or to be more exact, the NHM’s)
warehouses (Fasseur 1992:91–2).
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non-government sectors of commodity production in general, particularly but
not exclusively in the Vorstenlanden, or Principalities, of South-Central Java
(Houben 1993a:264–8, 1993b:53–7; Bosma 2007). The upshot of this several-fold
development was unmistakable. By 1860, in terms of value, ‘private’ mercan-
tile firms accounted for forty-six per cent of Java’s total export trade, and for
some sixty-five per cent of the export value of Java sugar. A decade later, in
1870, the comparable figures were fifty-one and seventy-two per cent (Korthals
Altes 1991:13–5, 142–6;Houben 1993b:49–52). In short, the nhmwas being edged
out—or was edging itself out—of Java’s export trade well before legislation in
Holland in 1870 pre-figured the end of the Cultuurstelsel and the NHM’s pur-
portedly monopolistic position.
All in the Family: TheMercantile Community’s Links with the
Indies State
One factor in the success of the European sector of Java’s mid-nineteenth-
century merchant community was undoubtedly its intimacy with the elite
Dutch personnel of the Indies state: the high office holders in Batavia and the
people established as Residents and Assistant-Residents throughout provin-
cial Java. To an extent, this intimacy had an informal character, based pre-
eminently on the family ties thatwere one of the vital sinews of theDutch colo-
nial presence in Java (and of the Indies’ links to themetropolis). These ties have
not been overlooked by historians, but have been undervalued nonetheless in a
historiography heavily focused on the development of institutions (Sutherland
1979; Van den Doel 1994; Fasseur 1999; Ong Hok Ham 1978). It remains the case,
however, that in Dutch colonial society in the mid-century Indies, elite family
ties had important ‘political’ connotations, and that the history of the colonial
state in this periodneeds to bewrittenwith close reference to the role playedby
consanguinity in articulating the relations between the state and colonial civil
society. Family tieswerewhatmade thewheels go round. Thiswas as true in the
business world as elsewhere. Social connections between mercantile houses
and state officials smoothed the way for business, but this understates the sit-
uation. The ‘official’ historian of one prominent mid-nineteenth-century firm,
for example, concluded that the excellent rapport between the firm’s principals
and high officials in Batavia meant, inter alia, that their enterprise was given
preferential treatment in matters relating to the shipping of cargoes of ‘state’
commodities (Molsbergen 1936:130–1). In this context, the extent towhich fam-
ily connection—and elite social networks in general—provided a significant
entrée to ‘the state’ bears both reiteration and elaboration.
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One substantial case in point was the firm of Maclaine Watson (discussed
in more detail below). Gillian Maclaine, joint-founder of the firm in Batavia in
1827, subsequently married a young woman with excellent family connections
with not one but two Governors General. Somewhat jocularly, he reported
home to Scotland that ‘my interest consequently at court is just as great as
a merchant requires’.13 His cousin Donald, later to become the firm’s senior
partner, carried on the family tradition by marrying a young woman, Emilie
Vincent, who was the Governor General’s sister-in-law (Christiaans 1986:50,
2003:1–7). The contemporary case of the firm of Reynst & Vinju makes it clear
thatMaclaineWatson’s links to the official establishmentwere not exceptional.
The Amsterdam-born Candidus ten Brink, the man who (in effect) founded
the firm in the 1820s, was reputably a good friend of J.C. Baud who, as Governor
General and subsequently long-serving colonialminister,was the leading figure
in Dutch colonial circles for two decades or more (Molsbergen 1936:5–8). At
least two subsequent Governors General entrusted the firm with management
of their private financial affairs (Molsbergen 1936:19, 35), and many of the
firm’s key mid-century personnel came into the business with a background in
government service. The most notable among these was Ambrosius Johannes
Willebrordus van Delden, senior partner in Reynst & Vinju and its virtual ceo
from 1855 until his death thirty-two years later. He had joined the firm after a
career in the nascent Indies bureaucracy that had culminated in the position
of adjunct government secretaris (Molsbergen 1936:22–3).
VanDeldenwas also akeyparticipant indevelopments early in the 1860s that
added a more formal, institutionalized character to the nexus between Java’s
European mercantile community and the Indies state. This was the establish-
ment in 1864 of Chambers of Commerce at Batavia, Semarang, and Surabaya
(as well as at the Outer Island ports of Makassar and Padang). To be sure, the
Chambers were set up at the behest of the Indies government, which regulated
the size of their membership (limited to seven members in each town) and
formally defined their functions (advising the government and disseminating
information relating to commerce and agriculture; see Oprigting Kamers van
Koophandel 1864:57–8). Yet, if this development was an indication, on the one
hand, of an embryonic, half-formed bureaucratic state’s determination to keep
apotentially ‘restive’ business community under surveillance, itwas also a clear
sign of the state’s recognition of the growing potency of that community. (It
was also a sign of that community’s increasing estrangement from its erstwhile
13 GillianMaclaine toMargeryMaclaine, Batavia 1-5-1833, Greenfield mss (in private posses-
sion, uk).
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Chinese Indonesian counterparts, since the latter were excluded from mem-
bership of the Chambers).
For the European members and their associates, the Chambers quickly
proved—as might be expected—to be a way of enabling business to gain the
ear of government.Within a few years of the inception of the Chamber of Com-
merce at Batavia, for example, its president, none other than Reynst & Vinju’s
VanDelden, foundhimself being invitedbyggPieterMeijer to spenda fewdays
with him at the vice-regal palace at Buitenzorg (Bogor) (Molsbergen 1936:47).
It seems reasonable to assume that it was not only the delightful mountain
scenery that was the subject of their conversations.
It is this history of close social ties between key members of Java’s European
mercantile community and leading officers of the Indies state that demon-
strates just how far wide of the mark the observation was—made in passing
more than a quarter of a century ago by one illustrious (but in this matter, ill-
informed) commentator—that the mid-century decades were the scene of a
‘twenty-year struggle of the Kultuurstelsel’s beamtenstaat against private colo-
nial capital (1848–1868)’.14 To the contrary, notions of a fundamentally antago-
nistic relationship need to be replaced by a far more nuanced picture of the
location of European mercantile enterprise within a colonial state that was
essentially a nurturing one for ‘private’ capital in general and mercantile inter-
ests in particular (Van Niel 1964:224–30; Rush 1990:118–9, 147–9).
This is not to say, of course, that there were not elements in the embry-
onic state bureaucracy that might well have regarded merchants and suchlike
as ‘pariah entrepreneurs’, or that there were not significant clashes of inter-
ests between the parties concerned. It is to assert, however, that the relations
between the mercantile houses and the state—and the state’s chief commer-
cial agent, the nhm and its Batavia Factorij—tended to be complimentary
rather than conflicting. One instance is the extent to which the nhm, the mer-
cantile houses in Java, and their Dutch connections collaborated over the pro-
vision of cargo space;15 another is the extent to which the NHM’s Batavia Fac-
torij, from the 1850s onward, began to play a key role in financing the produc-
tion of the commodities (through capital loans and the provision of working
capital to sugar manufacturers in particular) on which the ‘private’ mercan-
14 Anderson 1983:489 (the Germanic spelling in the quotation is Anderson’s own).
15 For example,when in January 1859VanEeghen’s ship, the Aligone, arrived at Surabayawith
a cargo of cotton piece goods from the Amsterdam firm, in the apparent absence of the
prospect of a good return cargo, its captain (Haacke) put the vessel ‘at the disposal of the
Factorij’ in order to obtain one. See Fraser Eaton to Van Eeghen, 18-2-1859, saa ve 447/1859
a–f.
324 knight
Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 170 (2014) 313–341
tile houses relied for their shipments worldwide (Knight 2007:51–3). In fact, in
the circumstances of mid-nineteenth-century Java, the ostensible dichotomy
between ‘state’ and ‘private’ is of limited utility.
Mid-century EuropeanMercantile Houses: Four Exploratory Case
Studies
During themid-century decades, from the 1840s to the 1860s, therewere around
two dozen European mercantile houses operating in colonial Java. Evidence
about their activities is fragmentary. Surviving documentation allows glimpses
without providing the wherewithal for a continuous history. Nor does it allow
us—until the end of the period under discussion—to differentiate with con-
fidence between those firms that operated in a modest way on the fringes of
global commodity chains (as suppliers, for example, of imported ‘necessities’ to
the Indies Dutch communities) and the island’s major import-export houses.16
The immediate selection of the present case studies is largely determined,
therefore, by the scant available evidence. Two of the four firmswent bankrupt,
an event which, however unhappy an experience for those involved, is a bonus
for historians, since bankruptcy almost invariably flushes information into
the public domain, from which it is usually absent. Of the other two, both
successful businesses, one of which lasted into the mid-twentieth century,
we know more for rather different reasons. One of them is the object of a
considerable amount of historical detective work by the present author, who
is currently completing a book on the firm’s early years. The other offers, here
only in embryo, the prospect of a much more substantial mid-century history
based on the survival of quantities of the papers of one of its leading partners.
Avowedly, therefore, this article represents work-in-progress, and its selection
of firms is a contingent one.
It is a selection, however, that serves to highlight some key dimensions of
European colonial mercantile activity in Java in the middle decades of the
twentieth century. In particular, it places a spotlight on the role of merchants
in promoting the production of commodities as well as the trade in them. It
also underlines themulti-facetednature ofmid-centurymercantile operations,
and the extent to which they operated on the colonial ‘periphery’ relatively
16 It was not until 1869 that the Government almanac (Regeeringsalmanak 1869:514–7) at-
tempted to distinguish among the listing of European firms between those engaged in
the import-export business and those whose chief business, for instance, was the retail of
goods to (mostly) Batavia’s European population.
toward a reappraisal of european mercantile houses in java 325
Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 170 (2014) 313–341
independent of metropolitan capital and control. In an important sense, these
were all enterprises based in the colonies. These and other issues relating to
a growing literature on mercantile developments in nineteenth-century Asia
will be reviewed in the final section of the article.
At the present juncture, however, it is important to signal the wider context.
The four firms under discussion operated at what was becoming one of the
key nodal points of Asian commerce, a commerce that was global as well as
inter- and intra-regional, and were situated along several of the world’s (then)
most important commodity chains—above all, those related to theproduction,
distribution, and sale of cotton good, coffee, and sugar. Even so, it is worth
remembering that the trade they conducted might sometimes be big in more
esoteric items. Formuch of the 1850s, for example, the trade in cattle hides from
East Java to a variety of European ports was a commercially significant one, and
noneof the firmsdiscussedherewere, or could afford tobe, exclusive specialists
in one commodity or another.
Rice, exported to Asian as well as European ports, was another major staple,
and one which relates, of course, to the question—one that can only be raised
but not answered here—of the level and degree of integration of these ‘Euro-
pean’mercantile houses into expandingAsian trading networks and systems of
distribution. Late in the nineteenth century, Java’s by then prime export com-
modity, industrially manufactured sugar, started on a thirty-year trajectory in
which it played a highly significant role in inter-regional trade in Asia itself, in
the process almost entirely slewing off any bilateral links between Asian colo-
nial producers and European processors and markets.
In short, the case studies form the basis—however tentative—for a num-
ber of hypotheses about the activities of European mercantile firms operating
in Java c.1850–1870. All concern the evolving role of Batavia (and other major
ports in Java) as a major Asian trade hub during the middle decades of the
nineteenth century, while simultaneously arguing for the historically specific
character of developments that linked mercantile interests to the production
as well as circulation of key commodities. Some provisional generalizations
are possible. Firstly, themajor houses were inevitably partnerships (none were
public companies—the possibility of incorporation and limited liability came
much later in the century) that lasted over several decades, though with sub-
stantial changes of personnel. Secondly, they usually had affiliates or associates
outside the port in which they were primarily located. Thirdly, they were gen-
eral commodity merchants whose business was not confined to any particular
itemof commerce. Fourthly and finally, their businesswasnot confined to com-
merce exclusively:most of themwere engaged in the production of the (export)
commodities in which they traded.
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Paine Stricker & Co: A Cosmopolitan Partnership
Just as wasmost likely the case with their Chinese and Arab counterparts oper-
ating across the maritime commercial networks of mid-nineteenth-century
Asia, European traders were also inclined to shift around to wherever business
seemed most promising. One of the two original partners in the Batavia-based
firm of Paine Stricker & Co, Charles Stricker (1798–1876), had been born in the
Danish settlement at Trankebar on the Coromandel Coast of the Indian sub-
continent, the son of the garrison commander there.17 Sent to Copenhagen at
the age of ten, in his late teens he gravitated back to subcontinent and seems
to have first made his appearance in the Indies sometime in the 1820s, as a sea
captainworking for theBatavia-basedBritishmerchantGeorgeHaswell. In 1833
he teamed up there with a young American, William Fritz Paine, whose career
in the East had begun in the China trade in the employ of the leading Boston
merchant and shipowner Thomas Handasyd Perkins.18 Fritz Paine was dead
within a year, and in 1839 Stricker left for Holland with his Dutch wife. The firm
itself, however, continued for another quarter of a century or more. It retained
its New England connection in the person of Alfred Augustus Reed (1817–1878),
who joined the firm in the mid-1840s, only returning to America more than a
decade later.19
Reed’s business partners in Batavia were Dutchmen, the brothers Ernst
Willem and Frederik Hendrik Cornelis Cramerus. Like them, Reed married
locally, thereby firmly securing his place in the Indies’ society and his links
to the regime, since his wife—Caroline Suzette van Son—was not only a
member of an elite colonial family, but also a near relative by marriage to the
apparently ubiquitous J.C. Baud, one time Governor General and subsequently
minister of colonies in the Hague. For good measure, Reed’s father-in-law was
a former Resident in the Indies’ colonial service and one of his brothers-in-law
was a member of the Raad van Justitie (Council of Justice/High Court) at
Batavia. Yet another brother-in-law cemented the relationship with Baud by
marrying (in succession) not one, but two of his daughters. Since the two
Cramerusbrothers alsomarried into the same family, Paine Stricker’s social and
17 Information kindly supplied to the author by Charles Stricker’s Dutch descendant,
William Stricker.
18 For information on Thomas Handasyd Perkins (1764–1854), see the entry in Wikipedia:
http://www25.uua.org/uuhs/duub/articles/thomasperkins.html.
19 VanNiel 1964:224–30; Guide to the AlfredAugustus Reed Papers—YaleUniversity, springer
.library.yale.edu:8083/fedora/get/mssa:ms.0411/PDF, accessed 2012.
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‘political’ position in the mid-nineteenth-century Indies’ world can be judged
a strong one (Coolhaas 1964:376–7).
So, too,was the firm’s commercial position, not least through its connections
with Java’s sugar industry. A.A. Reed himself was connected through marriage
to the owners of a number of sugar factories (one of whom was the younger
brother of a later minister of colonies in The Hague), while his firm was also
directly involved in the commodity’s production as the owners or financiers of
at least a couple of sugar factories inWest Java (Knight 2007:54). As we shall see
shortly, the upsurge in the trading of key commodities by the Java’s mercantile
houses during themid-century decades had at its basis not simply the purchase
of sugar and suchlike, but also an active involvement in the financing of its
production. Furthermore, if Paine Stricker were ‘big’ in sugar, it was far from
their only staple. Coffee was also a key commodity, for which purpose the
firm had a branch in Padang, on the coffee-rich west coast of Sumatra. They
were, likewise, one of a select number of European firms owning their own
ships—five in all in 1850 (Broeze 1979:262). Norwere these ‘merely’ light coastal
craft: indeed, in 1864, the firm’s (by then) two ships were the largest registered
at Batavia, and at around 800 tonnes each would have been fully capable of
making the intercontinental voyage to Europe or America (Regeeringsalmanak
1864:415).
Much of their trade, especially perhaps the coffee, was directed to North
America. Indeed, Reed evidently continued the Boston end of the business
from 1857 until his retirement from the firm in 1865. Paine Stricker also traded,
however, on theAmsterdammarket,where they dealtwith thewell-established
firm of Van Eeghen, a business that had once been primarily involved in the
tobacco trade with the Americas, but which by the middle of the nineteenth
century was rapidly expanding its connections with the Indies. From the late
1840s onward, Paine Stricker—judging from the frequency and volume of their
letters to Amsterdam—did considerable business with Van Eeghen, but they
were not their ‘agents’ in Java. Indeed, Van Eeghen had no single agent in
the colony, preferring instead to deal with as many as a dozen firms at any
one time. The Paine Stricker business closed down and was absorbed into the
Batavia-based firm of Busing, Schroder & Co late in the 1860s, by which time
Reed had left the firm and the brothers Cramerus had relocated to Holland,
where they continued to have business interests that connected them to the
Indies.20 The firm, in short, had been a successful enterprise that enabled its
20 Inter alia, E.W. Cramerus was one of the original, Netherlands-based directors (commis-
saris) of the Nederlandsch-Indische Handelsbank, founded in 1863. Another Cramerus
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partners to retire to ‘patria’ with their fortunes after several decades spent in
business in Java. That was how matters were supposed to work out. In reality,
of course, they sometimes did not.
Schimmelpenninck & Co: The Lure of Commodity Production
Gerrit Schimmelpenninck (1829–1874) did not make it ‘home’. Instead, he died
in the colonial town of Malang, in the uplands of Java’s Oosthoek (Eastern
Salient). To be sure, a goodly number of his contemporaries opted to settle per-
manently in the colony, rather than return to patria. For Schimmelpenninck,
however, it wasmost probably the case that he stayed in the colony because he
was a ruined man. Schimmelpenninck & Co was a large and ambitious enter-
prise with offices in Surabaya and Batavia as well as in the two Oosthoek ports
of Pasuruan and Probolinggo. In January 1863, however, it had suddenly ceased
trading.
The firm had begun operations in Java in the 1840s with little capital but a
promisingnumberof partners andgoodpotential ‘connections’.21Gerrit Schim-
melpenninck himself was born into a Dutch patrician family fromDeventer, in
the east of the Netherlands, where his father was a wine merchant. His son’s
chief strength in commercial circles was the fact that he could claim kinship
with a former ceo of the nhm, Graaf (Count) Gerrit Schimmelpenninck, who
hadbeenadirecteur of nhmduring its foundation years, between 1824 and 1827,
and subsequently its president from 1827 to 1833. The young man and his busi-
ness partners inBatavia evidentlymoved in thebest of circles: a daughter of one
of the latter, Constance van den Broek, became the wife of the later imperial-
ist Governor General C.H.A. van der Wijck, member of a rich and influential
family of Dutch aristocrats with strong links to the Indies. Credentials of this
kind were as important as capital, and appearance was everything: notepaper
with a printed letterhead—highly unusual for its time—was but one sign of the
rather grand vision that Schimmelpenninck had for his firm. Then, after nearly
two decades in business, it all went wrong. The firm was faced with massive
brother (Alexander Robert Jacobus) was an Indies-based director (commissaris) of the
Handelsbank from 1864 to 1866 (while simultaneously being a partner in Paine Stricker)
and subsequently ceo (directeur) from 1868 to 1887 (Korthals Altes 2004:27, 65).
21 Partners in the firm included J.W. Doijer (partner from 1847 to 1862); Willem Jacques van
den Broek (b. Amsterdam 1830 d. Rio de Janeiro 1874); J. (or D.) van den Burg; and Florus
Vriesendorp.
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bills to settle, and the fact that its credit had dried up. It did so, moreover, in
circumstances that saw a number of other major firms face bankruptcy.22
Schimmelpenninck & Co’s liabilities in the early months of 1863 were reck-
oned at the considerable sum of 1,600,000 guilders, with ‘assets’ (that is, sums
notionally owed to the firm) amounting to a little over 1,000,000 guilders.23 In
short, in what one contemporary mercantile house referred to as a ‘catastro-
phe’, the firm had lost over half a million guilders in the space of perhaps two
or three years. Some idea of the relative extent of the loss can be gauged from
the fact that VanEeghenandother bigAmsterdam trading firms of the daywere
reckoned to operate with a capital of between one and a half and two million
guilders (’t Hart, Jonker, and Van Zanden 1997:107). People who had left their
funds on deposit with the firmwere hit hard: one contemporary remarked that
‘we understand that various private individuals (verschillende particulieren),
who had made their fortune in the Indies have been either partly or totally
ruined’.24 Moreover, debts to creditors in Europe were so substantial that the
winding upof its affairs had to be postponed for sixmonths to allow for affected
parties in the Netherlands to be properly represented at the creditors’ meeting.
Among them was the firm of Van Eeghen, who had been doing business with
Schimmelpenninck over a number of years; it can be assumed that other Dutch
import-export houses were similarly affected.25 Nonetheless, there can be no
doubt that the root of Gerrit Schimmelpenninck andhis partners’ woeswas not
commercial per se. Rather, it was the fact that they had seriously overstretched
their resources in the financing of commodity production in Java itself, where
22 For a brief discussion of the crisis, see De Bree 1928, i:47–9; Mansvelt [1924–26], ii:
361–2.
23 Fraser Eaton to Van Eeghen, 26-1-1863 (saa ve 447/41), reiterated the point that the
creditors in Europe would have to be taken into account before any final settlement was
reached: ‘We learn that this will not be 40%’ [read: will be less] and 8-8-1863: ‘we strongly
doubt [emphasis in original] that the liquidation of Schimmelpennick’s affairs will yield
the 60% toutedby theCommissioners’. For a discussion of bankruptcy in the Indies (albeit
focused on a later period than the one under discussion here), see Claver and Lindblad
2009.
24 Paine Stricker to Van Eeghen, 29-1-1863, saa ve 447/43. In an altogether happier context,
the compiler of the celebratory history of Reynst & Vinju published for the Batavia firm’s
centenary in 1936 recorded that by the 1860s it had ‘become more and more common for
estate owners and well-off planters (grootgrondbezitters en zeer gefortuneerde planters)
to leave the management of their fortunes in the Batavia firm’s hands’ (Molsbergen
1936:46).
25 Paine Stricker to Van Eeghen, 29-1-1863, saa ve 447/43; Kopersmit & Co to Van Eeghen,
28-1-1863, saa ve 447/43.
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they had developed extensive and convoluted tieswith both sugarmanufactur-
ers and tobacco planters. Indeed, it took the assignees until 1869 to clear up the
mess.26
The context was one in which although, from c. 1860 onward, the Indies gov-
ernment auctioned locally (in Batavia) substantial quantities of sugar and cof-
fee (produced under the aegis of theCultuurstelsel), keen exporters also sought
out other avenues for obtaining access to key colonial commodities. The firm
of Reynst & Vinju, for example, entered into long-term financial arrangements
with the proprietors of the island’s largest ‘private’ estate to obtain supplies of
both coffee and sugar from ‘outside’ the Cultuurstelsel (Molsbergen 1936:20,
35). Other firms (Paine Stricker among them) owned or financed sugar fac-
tories that existed either inside or on the margins of the Stelsel, where they
benefited from the ‘free disposal’ sugar allowed to the manufacturers in addi-
tion to the portion of their output that the latter were contractually bound to
deliver to the Indies government. The dynamics of this situation need more
probing, but it looks as if many manufacturers retained a degree of finan-
cial autonomy. Either way, throughout the 1860s, they evidently had sufficient
financial strength to hold out for better prices from mercantile houses until
the last moment before the campaign or manufacturing season got under
way.27
It was, in short, a highly competitive business. Schimmelpenninck’s major
supplier of sugar, with whom the firm entered into short-term consignment
contracts (worth around 170,000 guilders per year) was one Baron (His Lord-
ship) Sloet vanOldruitenborgh. Sloet was both an ‘orthodox’ government sugar
contractor and the proprietor of an enterprise based on the ‘free’ cultivation
26 Fraser Eaton to Van Eeghen, 31-3-1869, saa ve 447/59.
27 During the course of 1860, for example, the Surabayan firm mentioned in Fraser Eaton’s
correspondence with Van Eeghen in Amsterdam included a catalogue of instances of
sugar manufacturers ( fabriekanten) holding out for higher prices for the forthcoming
season’s crop—holding out for prices, indeed, that ‘no-one Is disposed to pay’ and only—
sometimes—acquiescing after a great deal of haggling had gone on. See, for instance,
Fraser Eaton to Van Eeghen, 9-4-1860 and 6-7-1860, saa ve 447/41. This degree of auton-
omy was still in evidence c. 1870. For example, in April of that year, around one month
before the manufacturing season was due to commence, Maclaine Watson reported
that although the nhm Factorij had intervened in the market to the extent of buying
some 15,000 picul [one picul equals 61.76 kilo] the upcoming crop from ‘their mills’
for around 14.75 guilders per picul, and ‘although buyers have retired meanwhile from
the market, planters continue to retain high ideas for the future and are unwilling to
sell their crop even at the above rate’. Maclaine Watson to Van Eeghen, 19-4-1870, saa
ve 447/63.
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by the local peasantry of some four hundred and fifty hectares (600 bau) of
cane, which was likewise processed into sugar at his factory in Central Java.
Influence in the right quarters was essential to the success of an operation
of this kind: Sloet was the son-in-law of P.J.B. de Perez (d. 1859), a member
and, subsequently, vice-president of the Raad van Indië (Council of the Indies),
the Governor General’s advisory body, and in his latter position the second
most powerful individual in the Indies bureaucracy after the Governor Gen-
eral himself.28 Tobacco was the other major sought after commodity with
which Schimmelpenninck was involved. Indeed, in the 1850s, when the firm
was expanding its operations, tobacco was the ‘coming thing’ in parts of Cen-
tral and East Java,29 where a number of entrepreneurs successfully finessed
their relations with Indies’ officialdom to gain access to so-called ‘free’ peas-
ant labour to work their plantations (or, alternatively, to smallholder-grown
leaf).
Along with sugar, it was tobacco that proved the firm’s undoing.30 A run of
poor harvests, disappointing returns, and—quite possibly, though mercantile
sources are silent on this score—‘political’ complications arising from the fact
that, at the beginning of the 1860s, the cause of ‘free labour’ was temporarily
in abeyance within the Indies bureaucracy, meant that the firm found itself
with insufficient funds to carry on business. When the crash came, around
twenty per cent of the Schimmelpenninck’s total debts related to their deal-
ings in tobacco with two individuals, G.H. & N.G. de Voogt, long established as
planters of the commodity in the Rembang Residency of Central Java.31 Other
tobacco planters in East Java were also affected. Along with at least one other
sugar manufacturer Sloet van Oldruitenborgh lost his source of working cap-
ital, and after having first appealed in vain to the nhm to bail him out, was
refinanced by the Nederlandsch-Indische Handelsbank, one of the new wave
of metropolitan-based institutions (see below) that had begun, however tenta-
tively, to take an interest in the Indies.32
28 Fasseur 1992:169–72; Notulen Factorij, 11-2-1863 no. 827, Nationaal Archief, Den Haag [na],
Archief Hoofdkantoor Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, [nhm] 2.20.01/ 4408.
29 On tobacco in general, see Padmo 1994:21–40, 57–74.
30 See, for instance, Dorrepaal to Van Eeghen, 27-1-1863, saa ve 447/41.
31 Batavia Factorij to nhmA’dam, 29-1-1863, Confidentieel, na nhm 2.20.01/7358. On the ‘free’
cultivation of tobacco inRembang and the political storm that it started in colonial circles,
see Fasseur 1992:171–84.
32 In 1864 the nihb advanced 152,000 guilders in working capital. For this and the history of
his subsequent relations with the nihb, see Korthals Altes 2004:52, 100–1.
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Barend Kopersmit & Co: Java Traders and the Cotton Commodity
Chain
Schimmelpenninck’s collapse in 1863 was primarily the result of the over-
stretching of its resources in the financing of commodity goods production in
the colony itself. An equally spectacular business failure in the colony, some
six years later, in the middle of 1869, pointed in a different direction: the pit-
falls inherent in the location of Java’s mercantile houses on the volatile cotton
goods commodity chain that linked markets in Asia to centres of raw mate-
rial production and industrial manufacture on the other side of the world. This
particular commodity chain—by far the most significant and extended of its
kind in nineteenth-century international commerce—experienced dramatic
upheavals in the 1860s, occasioned by the American CivilWar and the threat to
the chain’s raw material supplies inherent therein.
Most immediately, the effect in Asian markets was to force up prices. In
turn, this encouraged ‘an immense’ consignment of cottons to Batavia and
the other Javanese ports from the Netherlands and the uk, as manufacturers
and mercantile houses sought to exploit the situation. The (prospective) good
times came to an end, however, with the termination of the Civil War and a
subsequent global fall in the price, as panic about the drying up of supplies
of raw cotton subsided. The stage was hence set for chaotic conditions on the
Indies’ cotton market, as cotton traders were caught with huge stocks on a
rapidly falling market. For them, 1868 became a disaster year.
Especially in Batavia, the Indies Chinese traders, who were the main con-
duit for the distribution of cotton goods imported by the European mercantile
houses, almost all went bankrupt or had to ‘reach an accommodation’ with
their creditors (Verslag Koophandel 1870:125, 133–4, 168–73). Nor was the crisis
over quickly. Reporting some two years later on the depressed state of the local
market for piece goods in the middle of 1870, the substantial firm of Maclaine
Watson (see below) noted: ‘In the Chinese camp a little more activity has been
apparent, and we hope that this will be the precursor of improved business.’ As
it turnedout, however, this optimismwaspremature, since the ‘piece goodmar-
ket is rather inactive […] and the improvement our dealers had expected has
not set in […] Our Chinese dealers are unfortunately in anything but a prosper-
ous condition andmany importers are very [wary] of extending them credit’.33
This train of events, of course, also strained the resources of the European
mercantile houses themselves. Indeed, one of the foremost Indies’ victims of
33 Maclaine Watson to Van Eeghen, 24-6-1870, 22-7-1870, and 13-10-1870, saa ve 447/63.
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this latest period of boom and bust along the cotton commodity chain was
the substantial and long-established Batavia-based firm of Kopersmit & Co
(they had been in business there for around three decades) and the associate
firms of Von Hemert & Co (Batavia) and Bicker & Co (Surabaya).34 At an initial
meeting of the interested parties in Batavia, immediately after Kopersmit & Co
were forced to stop payments, it was ‘ascertained that the chief creditors are
in Europe’.35 They included Barend Kopersmit himself, who had retired to Hol-
land (and a mansion on the outskirts of Leiden) around 1854, and presumably
left his capital in the Indies with the firm that he had founded.
Among the other similarly situated creditors were the Amsterdam bankers
Alstorphius & Von Hemert, a well-established firm that was a core presence
in the Amsterdam business establishment of the mid-century decades. Inter
alia, it had been instrumental in financing loans for railway construction in
the United States during the 1850s and 1860s (Veenendaal 1996:23, 59, 71, 180,
225). Batavia-based J.Ph. von Hemert, chief partner in Von Hemert & Co, was
a scion of the Alstorphius & Von Hemert families.36 The Amsterdam banker’s
stake in the Kopersmit concerns centred on its recent financing of cotton
goods consignments to Batavia worth more than one quarter of a million
guilders.37 It was indicative of the size of their potential losses (and of the fact
that they had secured a deal with the nhm in Amsterdam to transfer some
of the goods to them) that they were represented at the creditors’ meeting in
Batavia, in October 1869, by both the ceo (president) of the NHM’s Batavia
34 According to Maclaine Watson to Van Eeghen (26-6-1869 saa ve 447/59) Kopersmit’s
assets were put at ƒ203,000 and their liabilities at ƒ847,000. It was hence estimated that the
creditors would get 23%. According to this same source, Von Hemert and Co had recently
lost ƒ 170,000 on a shipment of rice to Australia. Partners in several enterprises at the time
of the collapse included J.G. Platte Jr and J.Ph. von Hemert. The information in the fol-
lowing paragraphs comes from the [printed] enclosure ‘Resumé van het verhandelde in
de vergadering van de firma’s B. Kopersmit & Co in liq. en Von Hemert & Co., Batavia—
Bickert & Co., Sourabaija, gehouden in het lokaal van de Javasche Bank op Vrijdag den
22 October 1869’, enclosed in Maclaine Watson to Van Eeghen, 2-11-1869, saa ve 447/69.
This (semi-public) document does not contain any indication of the relative amounts of
money involved.
35 Maclaine Watson to Van Eeghen, 23-5-1869 and 26-6-1869, saa ve 447/59.
36 J.Ph. von Hemert (b. Amsterdam 1831 d. Yokohama 1894) was one of the merchant sons
of the Amsterdam banker J. Alstorphius von Hemert (b. Amsterdam 1797 d. Amsterdam
1854).
37 For details of the cotton goods consignments (worth ƒ270,000) and the involvement of
the nhm, see nhm Inkomende Brieven Factorij Batavia, 14-5-1869/5422; 20-5-1869/5429;
28-5-1869/5440; and 11-6-1869/5443, na nhm, Archief 7365.
334 knight
Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 170 (2014) 313–341
Factorij, P.C. van Oosterzee, and a Factorij board member (lid). In all, the
Kopersmit and their associates’ creditors included more than forty mercantile
houses, manufacturers, and individuals in Europe (twenty-three of them in
Germany) and another dozen or so in the Indies. One further creditor was in
the Antipodes: the Sydney firm of Fanning, Griffiths & Co.
The historical interest in Kopersmit’s bankruptcy relates not only to cot-
ton goods per se, but also to what it revealed about the changing character of
investment in mercantile speculations in the Indies during the course of the
1860s. Among Kopersmit’s creditors were a number of (quasi-) financial insti-
tutions, some of them native to the Indies and others based overseas. Here, in
embryo at least, was the institutional underpinning that was such a vital part
of the financing of late colonial enterprise in the Indies, mercantile as well as
agricultural. The institutions were the Batavia-based Nederlandsch-Indische
Escompto Maatschappij; the Amsterdam-based Nederlandsch-Indische Han-
delsbank; the Bataviasche Spaarbank; the London-based Chartered Bank of
India, Australia andChina; the Internationale Crediet- enHandelsveereeniging
‘Rotterdam’ (later known as Internatio); the Javasche Bank; and the Batavia-
based Oost Indische Maatschappij van Administratie en Lijfrente. Of these
institutions, only the last two had existed at the beginning of the period under
consideration.38 Hence, we are looking at a considerable expansion over the
course of some thirty years of the credit facilities available tomercantile houses
in the Indies—an expansion that dated essentially from the 1860s. It was not
sufficient, however, to save Kopersmit and his Java associates.
MaclaineWatson: An Asia-basedMercantile Network
Broadly speaking, around the middle of the nineteenth century the commer-
cial and financial metropolitan ‘core’ began to exert a hitherto unprecedented
degree of control over the global ‘periphery’. It did so, inter alia, because of
the way in which such control, fuelled by economic growth in the ‘core’, was
facilitated by developments in communications and transport.39 With respect
to British India, for example, the case has been made that the mid-century
decades saw (by and large) the replacement of an earlier generation of quasi-
autonomous Europeanmercantile houseswith a newbreed of enterprisemuch
38 For a recent, succinct survey of credit institutions in the Indies c. 1850–70, see Claver
2006:67–8; De Graaf 2012:68–70
39 John Darwin makes the point with his usual concision and elegance in Darwin 2009:63.
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more in thrall to metropolitan financial and commercial interests than had
been the case with their immediate predecessors (Webster 2009:12, 92–8). The
point is well taken, and, as we have just seen, had a limited degree of applica-
bility to contemporary Java. Yet, it is not the whole picture, anymore than the
‘core’ and ‘periphery’ binary upon which it rests is a totally satisfactory way of
analysing the ‘world economy’. The long-lived firm of Maclaine Watson (1827–
1964) offers an illuminating instance of just how problematic such a scenario
might be.
The firm’s founder, Gillian Maclaine (1798–1840), arrived in Java from Lon-
don in 1820. His subsequent partner, Edward Watson, arrived a couple of years
later, and quickly became involved in the importation of cotton goods from
Europe and the export of Java coffee.40 From the outset, he was enmeshed in a
network of businesses that included his own firm in Batavia (with an agency
further along the coast in Semarang), a sister firm in Singapore, a Calcutta
Agency House, and—at the London end of the business—the firm that he had
worked for when he had first come down from the Highlands in 1816. However,
Maclaine was not merely the latter’s agent in Batavia. Indeed, this was some-
thing that he staunchly resisted becoming. Rather, he was a partner with the
London East India House and their connection in Calcutta—together with the
newly formed business in Singapore—in the rudimentary business network
knownasGillianMaclaine&Coof Batavia. Itwas an arrangement that cost him
dear, and its dissolution in 1827 and the establishment of Maclaine Watson &
Co was explicitly designed to circumvent its evident drawbacks. Nonetheless,
the new firmwas as singular as its predecessor; indeed, evenmore so.Maclaine
Watson was not a single, hierarchically organized enterprise; rather, it was a
group of firms that by the 1830s had come to embrace businesses in Singapore
(Maclaine Fraser & Co), Semarang (McNeill & Co), and in East Java’s key port-
city of Surabaya (Fraser Eaton & Co) as well in Batavia itself (MaclaineWatson
& Co). By this date, moreover, the whole network drew the greater part of its
business not from the bilateral trade with Europe, but from the intra-Asian
Country Trade (Knight 2014).
By the 1860s, however, Maclaine Watson and its closely associated compa-
nies in Semarang and Surabaya had begun to change direction once again.
Although they had not removed themselves from the trade in the cotton goods
from Europe or from the Country Trade, they were starting to shape up as a
business whose interests were primarily in sugar, the key commodity of Java’s
export trade by the 1880s and already well to the fore in the two decades before
40 For a short, pioneering biography of Maclaine, see Broeze 2005.
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that. Fraser Eaton, located in Surabaya in close proximity to the biggest single
concentration of sugar factories in the entire colony (they also had a branch
office in the ‘sugar town’ of Pasuruan further east along the coast),would appear
to have lead the way in this development, but their partners in Batavia also
owned or financed factories in West Java, nearer their own commercial base.
By 1884, when the collapse of the price for industrially manufactured sugar
precipitated a crisis throughout the international sugar economy and Java was
badly hit, Maclaine Watson traded more of the island’s sugar than any of their
contemporaries. Unlike many of the latter, however, this Scots-Dutch combine
survived.
‘Maclaine Watson’ as it had developed during the middle decades of the
nineteenth century had already taken on the form that was to characterize
it for the next hundred years. That is to say, it was not a single firm, but (in
effect) a network of firms held together by the ties of consanguinity and by
wider ethnic loyalties. The points at issue are discussed in ForbesMunro’smon-
umental workMaritime enterprise and empire (2003) in the context of another,
somewhat later and altogether grander business with significant roots in a sim-
ilar ethnic background to that in which the Maclaine concern was embedded.
The ‘difference’ in the case of Maclaine Watson was underscored by the fact
that it was (and continued to be, throughout its long history) a ‘family firm’,
even though the families involved were not those of its founders, and included
Dutchmen as well as the inevitable Scots (Crickhowell 2009:131–4; [Maclaine
Watson] [1927]:1–16). As such, it formed an outstanding example of the extent
to which ‘families could be as successful as managers in owning and man-
aging business concerns’ (Jones 2008:419–21). Despite the great volume of its
business, it was never incorporated as a limited company. Moreover, although
MaclaineWatsonopenedaLondonoffice (in the 1880s), the firm’s headquarters
continued to be located in the East. In the absence of any such metropolitan
‘parent’, however, andwith its base inBatavia and its associatedbusinesses else-
where in the Indies and in Singapore, Maclaine Watson remained to an extent
sui generis—an outlier of the dominant modes in which European business in
Asia was connected tometropolitan interests. This did not, of course, make the
firm unique, but it did place it among a relatively discrete category of ‘colonial’
firms that lacked a ‘home’ base of the kind frequently ascribed to businesses of
this kind, at least to those established outside the so-called colonies of settle-
ment.
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Towards a Conclusion
What is a mercantile house? More specifically, what was a mercantile house
in mid-nineteenth-century Java? It is easier, perhaps, to indicate what it was
not: a business solely concerned with trade. The firms that we have catego-
rized as ‘mercantile houses’ operating in Batavia, and in Java’s other two main
ports, between the 1840s and c. 1870 were anything but exclusively engaged
in commerce. As a recent writer has remarked apropos of a somewhat later
period of time, ‘the identity—“trading house”—was in fact often a misnomer’
(Miller 2012:108). Rather, in the case of mid-century Java, in addition to ‘purely’
commercial ventures, they operated as bankers, insurance agents, ship-owners,
and—above all—as the financiers of commodity production on the island
itself. Sometimes this involvement extended into the direct ownership of com-
modity-producing concerns, such as sugar factories. To be sure, in respect to
export staples, they were able to benefit from the commodity output of the
state-run Cultuurstelsel, substantial amounts of which, from c. 1860 onward,
the Indies government began to auction in the colony itself. An at least equally
important source of supply, however, was to be found in the ‘free disposal’ out-
put of government contractors and from enterprises—sugar factories, tobacco
plantations, and coffee estates—that existed either on the margins of the
Stelsel or entirely outside of it (as was the case, in particular, with commod-
ity producers in the Vorstenlanden of South-Central Java).
To do this, of course, they had to have money. Few of the mid-century
mercantile firms could be described as offshoots of metropolitan European (or
North American) business concerns that might have financed their operations
with metropolitan capital. This was certainly the case with the four Java-based
firms discussed here. Indeed, there is no evidence that the partners in these
four firms brought substantial financial capital with them into theirmercantile
ventures—though in a number of ascertainable cases they certainly brought
social and political ‘capital’ in significant quantities. One important key to
the establishment of a successful business inmid-nineteenth-century Java was
access through family ties to thehalf-formedbureaucracyof the Indies state.An
older historiography that emphasized the ‘hegemony’ exerted by state officials
in mid-nineteenth-century Java was not entirely wrong. Its great shortcoming,
however, was its failure to grasp how porous an institution that bureaucracy
was at that time in its history, and how permeated it was by the interests of the
emergent colonial bourgeoisie.
Nevertheless, therewere limits to the benefits that ‘connections’ could bring.
The fact that their owners moved in the right circles did not prevent the
large-scale bankruptcies of two of the firms under discussion. Credit was tight,
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and these firms went under, it may be suspected, due to a lack of it, rather
than because of the lack of probity of their partners. As emerges from the
narrative, a number of institutional sources of commercial credit (in addition
to the Java Bank), some with backing in Europe, made their appearance in
Java during the 1860s. The amount of capital involved at this date, however,
was not large—perhaps less a reflection of Dutch ‘caution’ than of the fact
that Dutch investors much preferred to place their money into such things as
North American railway companies. Beyond Java, that is to say, and beyond
the commercial correspondents of Java’s mercantile houses and the latter’s
commodity suppliers inmetropolitan Europe, themoney trail goes cold. In the
1880s, surveying themercantile andmanufacturing scene in the Indies as it was
impacted upon by the deepening ‘sugar crisis’ in the middle of that decade,
an expatriate Dutch businessman (Jan Hudig) with much experience in the
Indies publicly made the claim that contemporary colonial entrepreneurs had
largelymade their ownway financially until the crisis struck.41 Hehad the sugar
industry mostly in mind, but it is difficult to divorce his argument—which he
supported with a variety of broad financial estimates—from an assessment of
the Indies’ business world as a whole. That assessment, in turn, needs to be
based on an altogether more far-reaching analysis of the source material than
can be essayed within the confines of the present, exploratory article.
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